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This paper attempts to combine the analysis of wage (income) polarization with that 
of wage (income) mobility. Using the polarization index PG recently proposed by 
Deutsch et al. (2007) it shows that, when taking the identity of the individuals into 
account (working with panel data), a distinction can be made between a change over 
time in polarization that is the consequence of "structural mobility" (change over time 
in the overall, between and within groups inequality) and a change in polarization that 
is the sole consequence of "exchange mobility" (changes over time in the ranks of the 
individuals). This approach is then applied to the 1985-2003 Work Histories Italian 
Panel (WHIP), an employer-employee linked panel database developed by the Italian 
Social Security administrative sources. The empirical investigation attempts to improve 
our  understanding  of  labor  market  segmentation  in  Italy,  whether  the  groups  are 
defined on the basis of the individual wages or derived from other criteria such as 
white versus blue collar workers.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
As is by now well-known the concept of labor market segmentation introduced by Piore 
and Doeringer (1971) is based on the idea that in the labor market there are mainly two 
non-competing groups corresponding respectively to what has been called the primary 
and the secondary sector. The primary sector generally includes mainly higher-status 
and  better-paid  jobs  and  in  this  market  skills  and  educational  credentials  play  an 
important role. In the secondary sector jobs are usually low-skilled and most of the time 
require little training. Wages are low and hence there is a high level of labor turnover. 
Job mobility between the two sectors is assumed to be normally quite limited, mainly 
because  workers  in  the  secondary  sector  are  trapped  there  unless  they  manage  to 
increase their educational or skill level. The secondary sector is also characterized by 
higher levels of underemployment and unemployment.  
This gross description of the labor market cannot however be simply applied to all 
economies, even if one limits oneself to Western countries. As argued by Contini (2002) 
it  seems  that  "upward  and  downward  earning  mobility  of  the  relatively  better  off-
fraction of the work-force  is higher in the USA than in the European countries. Labor 
market segmentation in the lower tail of the earning distribution is higher in the USA 
than in continental Europe. The Scandinavian countries are even more distant from the 
USA…". 
Empirical  studies  of  the  phenomenon  of  labor  market  segmentation  have  generally 
emphasized the increasing level of pay inequality but have also checked whether low 
skilled individuals are "trapped" in the lower part of the earnings distribution or whether 
there  is  a  relatively  high  level  of  mobility  so  that  a  low  pay  may  be  a  temporary 
phenomenon. Whereas the desire to focus on earning mobility rather than on earning 
inequality is certainly laudable, such an effort may not be sufficient to obtain a complete 
picture of the situation in the labor market. Recent work on the concept of polarization 
and its implications concerning the possibility of conflict has emphasized the idea that 
the  degree  of  polarization  should  be  an  increasing  function  of  earning  differences 
between groups but a decreasing function of earning differences within groups. 
The purpose of this paper is first to propose a methodology allowing the combination of 
information on polarization and mobility, second to give an empirical illustration based   4 
on quite unique data on the Italian labor market. The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the methodology while section 4 
presents the results of en empirical investigation based on these Italian data. The paper 
ends by emphasizing some preliminary conclusions which could be drawn from such 
type of analysis. 
 
2.  On Indices of Polarization and Mobility: 
 
Since this paper attempts to combine the analysis of wage (income) polarization with 
that of wage (income) mobility we shortly review the literature on these two topics. 
Polarization describes the appearance (or disappearance) of groups in the distribution 
(Esteban  and  Ray,  2005).  In  the  literature,  we  observe  two  families  of  polarization 
measures. The first family includes measures designed to capture the formation of any 
arbitrary number of groups (Esteban and Ray, 1994; Duclos, Esteban and Ray, 2004; 
Kanbur  and  Zhang,  2001;  Deutsch  and  Silber,  2008b).  The  second  family  sees 
polarization  as  the  process  by  which  a  distribution  becomes  bi-polarized  (Wolfson, 
1994 and 1997; Foster  and Wolfson, 1992; Wang and Tsui, 2000; Chakravarty  and 
Majumder, 2001; Deutsch et al., 2007). However, both families consider the following 
properties as indispensable to a measure of polarization: (i) polarization is a matter of 
groups so that  when there is one  group only there should be little polarization; (ii) 
polarization rises when “within-group” inequality is reduced; and, (iii) polarization rises 
when  “between  group”  inequality  increases.  Note  that  the  notion  of  polarization  is 
different from that of inequality since the second property mentioned previously runs 
against the ordering of distributions based on second order stochastic dominance.   
Income mobility is about how much income each recipient receives at two or more 
points in time. We focus on the concept of intra-generational mobility and, therefore, we 
shortly review only the corresponding literature. Extensive surveys of the literature on 
income  mobility  may  be  found  in  Atkinson,  Bourguignon  and  Morrison  (1992), 
Maasoumi  (1998),  Solon  (1999),  Fields  and  Ok  (1999a)  and  Fields  (2007).  Fields 
(2007), for example, emphasizes the lack of agreement about the various concepts of 
mobility and identifies six different concepts of intra-generational mobility. The first 
one  stresses  time  independence  (how  strongly  is  current  income  dependent  on  past 
income).  The  other  concepts  focus  on  “movement”.  They  basically  compare  the 
incomes of specific individuals at two different periods and attempt to measure how   5 
much movement took place. A distinction should here be made between the notion of (i) 
positional movements that are movements of individuals among various positions in the 
income  distribution  (see,  King,  1983;  Jenkins  and  Van  Kerm,  2003);  (ii)  share 
movements that take place if and only if at least one individual’s income rises or falls 
relative to the mean; (iii) non-directional income movement which gauges the extent of 
fluctuation in individual incomes (see, Fields and Ok, 1996 and 1999b); (iv) directional 
income movement (i.e. Fields and Ok, 1999b); and, (v) movement which amount to an 
equalization of longer term incomes (i.e. Fields, 2005). Measures of income mobility 
are designed to analyze the concepts mentioned previously and they usually satisfy a set 
of desirable properties. One of them (see, Bartholomew, 1982, and Markandya, 1982 
and  1984)  is  the  decomposability  of  mobility  into  (a)  a  component  reflecting  the 
variation  over  time  of  the  inequality  of  incomes  ("structural  mobility')  and  (b)  an 
element  that  corresponds  to  a  change  in  the  ranking  of  the  individuals  (“exchange 
mobility”). 
As far as we know, the literature on polarization did not consider however what impact 
these two types of mobility may have on the level of polarization observed in society. 
The aim of this paper is to show how it is possible to make a distinction between a 
component of the change in polarization that is related to structural mobility and another 
component of this change that is the consequence of exchange mobility, 
 
3.  Methodological framework 
 
In a recent note Deutsch et al. (2007) proposed a new index of bipolarization defined as 
 
G G G P W B G / ) ( − =   (1) 
 
where  W B G G ,    and   G    refer respectively to the between groups , the within groups and 
the overall Gini index (for the whole distribution). Note that this formulation assumed 
that there were only two groups and of equal size, the “poor” and the “rich”, who are 
respectively those individuals earning less and more than the median income.   
In  another  paper  Deutsch  and  Silber  (2008b)  showed  that  this  index    G P     could  be 
extended  to  the  case  where  there  are  more  than  two  groups  and  where  the  income   6 
distributions of these groups overlap. In such a case the overall Gini index  G  will be 
expressed as 
O G G G W B + + =   (2) 
 
 
where  Ois a residual which measures the degree of overlap between the distributions 
(see, Silber, 1989). The polarization index  G P  will then be expressed as 
 
) /( ) ( O G G G G P W B W B G + + − =   (3) 
 
Although the residual Ocannot be considered as being independent of the between and 
within  groups  components
2  it  should  be  clear  that  this  index  G P   has  the  two  most 
desirable properties of a polarization index: 
-  it increases with the between groups inequality  B G : 
Assume a given within groups inequality  W G . The numerator of (3) is always smaller 
than  the  denominator  of  (3),  even  in  the  case  where  there  is  no  overlapping  O. 
Therefore  as  the  between  groups  index  B G increases,  although  the  overlapping  term 
Owill then decrease, the denominator of (3) will remain greater than the numerator and 
therefore  the  proportional  change  in  the  numerator  will  be  greater  than  that  in  the 
denominator and the net effect will be an increase in  G P  . 
3 
-  it decreases with the within groups inequality  W G : 
Assume a given between groups inequality  B G  . When the within groups inequality  W G  
increases, the numerator of (3) will decrease. For a given between groups inequality, the 
increase  in  W G will  also  imply  an  increase  in  the  overlapping  term  O  and  so  the 
                                                 
 
2 See Dagum (1997) for an alternative decomposition of the Gini index where the sum of the between 
groups index  B G and of the residual Ois called "across groups" Gini index.   
3 In the extreme case where the within groups inequality  W G is equal to 0 (and hence Ois equal to 0), the 
polarization index would be equal to 1 and thus become invariant to an increase in the between groups 
inequality.  In  such  an  extreme  case  one  may  want  to  express  the  polarization  index  as 
) /( ) ( ε + + − = W B W B G G G G G P  where  0 ⇒ ε  so that  G P would still increase when the between 
groups inequality  B G increases.   7 
denominator  in  (3)  will  increase.  As  a  consequence  the  polarization  index  G P   will 
decrease
4. 
Let us now assume that this index  G P   is computed at two different periods, times 0 and 
1, in which its value will be expressed as  0 G P  and  1 G P . The change  G P ∆  in polarization 
between times 0 and 1 may therefore be written as 
 
) / ) (( ) / ) (( ) ( 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 G G G G G G P P P W B W B G G G − − − = − = ∆   (2) 
 
where  Wt Bt G G ,  and  t G  refer to the between groups , the within groups and the overall 
Gini indices at time   t    ( ( 0 = t o or r   1) ). .      
   
Expression (2) may also be written as 
   
) , , ( G G G f P W B G ∆ ∆ ∆ = ∆   (3) 
 
where  W B G G ∆ ∆ ,  and  G ∆  refer respectively to the change in the between groups, the 
within groups and in the overall Gini index that took place between times 0 and 1. 
The  measure  G P ∆   is  however  an  anonymous  measure  of  the  overall  change  in 
polarization  between  times  0  and  1,  since  it  completely  ignores  the  identity  of  the 
individuals. It is simply derived from the computation of the degree of polarization at 
both periods. If, for example, we divide the population in two income groups, those 
with an income below and above the median income, it is very likely that the identity of 
the individuals having an income below the median income will not exactly be the same 
at both periods, because there certainly will have been some degree of income mobility 
between times 0 and 1. 
Let us therefore define as  Wts Bts G G ,  and  ts G  the between groups, within groups and 
total Gini indices, assuming these indices are computed on the basis of the income the 
                                                 
 
4 In the extreme case where the between groups inequality  B G  is equal to zero, there clearly will be 
overlap. In such a case the polarization index  G P will be negative. An increase in the within inequality 
W G  will then increase more the numerator than the denominator (in absolute value). Since the index is 
negative in such a case, this implies that an increase in  W G will lead to a decrease in  G P .   8 
various individuals would have received at time t, had their rank been that they had at 
time s. Using these notations the indices    0 0, W B G G a an nd d    0 G    i in n   ( (2 2) )   would be expressed as      
00 00, W B G G     a an nd d    00 G     and  similarly  the  indices    1 1, W B G G a an nd d    1 G     i in n    ( (2 2) )    would  be 
expressed as    11 11, W B G G    a an nd d    11 G . .   Let us also call    Gts P    the value of the polarization index   
which is obtained when it is based on the indices    Wts Bts G G ,    and   ts G . .   The indices    1 G P    
a an nd d    0 G P    in (2) will therefore from now on be expressed as  11 G P  and  00 G P .   
But we could also compute a polarization index    10 G P    which would measure the degree 
of polarization that would be obtained on the basis of the incomes at time 1, assuming 
the individuals kept the rank they had at time 0. Similarly a polarization index       01 G P    
would measure the degree of polarization that would be obtained on the basis of the 
incomes at time 0, assuming the rank of the individuals at time 0 was that they had at 
time 1. 
We may therefore want to give an alternative definition of the change in polarization 
between times 0 and 1, one that would not ignore the identity of the individuals and 
would be expressed, for example, as 
 
) / ) (( ) / ) (( ) ( ' 00 00 00 10 10 10 00 10 G G G G G G P P P W B W B G G G − − − = − = ∆   (4) 
 
Another possibility is to define such a non anonymous change in polarization as 
 
) / ) (( ) / ) (( ) ( ' ' 01 01 01 11 11 11 01 11 G G G G G G P P P W B W B G G G − − − = − = ∆   (5) 
 
At this stage let us use, for example, expression (5) and rewrite it as 
 
)] / ) (( ) / ) [((
)] / ) (( ) / ) [(( ) ( ' '
01 01 01 00 00 00
00 00 00 11 11 11 01 11
G G G G G G
G G G G G G P P P
W B W B
W B W B G G G
− − − +




Note that the first element on the R.H.S. of (6) measures the change in polarization that 
is obtained under the assumption of anonymity. The second element on the R.H.S. of 
(6) computes the hypothetical change in polarization that is obtained when using the 
same  incomes  (those  the  individuals  receive  at  time  0)  but  the  first  time  these   9 
individuals are assumed to have the ranking they indeed had at time 0, the second the 
ranking they had at time 1. 
Similarly  G P ' ∆  in (4) may be also expressed as 
 
)] / ) (( ) / ) [((
)] / ) (( ) / ) [(( ) ( ' '
00 00 00 11 11 11
11 11 11 10 10 10 00 10
G G G G G G
G G G G G G P P P
W B W B
W B W B G G G
− − − +




Note that this time the first element on the R.H.S. of (7) computes the hypothetical 
change  in  polarization  that  is  obtained  when  using  the  same  incomes  (those  the 
individuals receive at time 1) but the first time these individuals are assumed to have the 
ranking they indeed had at time 0, the second the ranking they had at time 1. It is easy to 
observe  that  the  second  element  on  the  R.H.S.  of  (7)  measures  the  change  in 
polarization that is obtained under the assumption of anonymity. 
 
Clearly we can also combine (6) and (7) to derive an average  G P ' ' ' ∆  which would then 
be expressed as 
 
)]} / ) (( ) / ) [((
)] / ) (( ) / ) ){[(( 2 / 1 (
)] / ) (( ) / ) [(( ' ' '
11 11 11 10 10 10
01 01 01 00 00 00
00 00 00 11 11 11
G G G G G G
G G G G G G
G G G G G G P
W B W B
W B W B
W B W B G
− − − +
− − − +





The first expression on the R.H.S. measures again the change in polarization, assuming 
anonymity.  The second element on the R.H.S. of (8) computes the hypothetical change 
in polarization that is obtained when using the same incomes, that is, either those the 
individuals receive at time 1 or those they receive at time 0, but in each case these 
individuals are assumed to have first the ranking they indeed had at time 0, second the 
one they had at time 1. It is in fact easy to show that (8) is the expression one would 
have  derived  had  one  applied  the  by  now  quite  famous  so-called  Shapley 
decomposition.   A A   s sh ho or rt t   d di is sc cu us ss si io on n   o of f   t th he e   p pr ro op pe er rt ti ie es s   o of f   t th he e   m me ea as su ur re es s   o of f   n no on n   a an no on ny ym mo ou us s   
c ch ha an ng ge e   i in n   p po ol la ar ri iz za at ti io on n   i is s   g gi iv ve en n   i in n   A Ap pp pe en nd di ix x      A A. .                                                                              10 
Let  us  now  be  more  explicit  about  the  way  to  compute  expressions  like 
01 10 01 10 01 , , , , G G G G G W W B B   and  10 G .  We  know  (see,  Silber,  1989)  that  the  between 
groups Gini index  B G  may be written as 
 
Gs f GB ' =   (9) 
 
where  ' f  is a row vector giving the shares of the various groups in the total population, 
the groups being ranked by decreasing values of the average incomes of the groups. 
Similarly  s is a column vector giving the shares of the various groups in total income, 
the groups being ranked by decreasing values of their average incomes. 
Finally, assuming there are  K groups,  G  is a  K by  K square matrix called G-matrix 
(see, Silber, 1989) whose typical element  ij g is equal to 0 if  j i = , to -1 if  i j f and to 
+1 if  j i f . 
Therefore in defining  01 B G  we will rank the groups in  ' f  and  s by their decreasing 
average incomes at time 1 but will give each group its income share at time 0. Note that 
since  we  work  with  non  anonymous  groups,  there  will  evidently  be  no  difference 
between the population shares at time 0 and 1. 
Similarly in defining  10 B G  we will rank the groups in  ' f  and  s by their decreasing 
average incomes at time 0 but will give each group its income share at time 1.  
To compute the within groups inequality  Wts G  we have to remember that the within 












where  k k w f ,  and  k G  represent respectively the population shares, the income shares 
and the Gini index of group k . Note that  k G  is defined as 
 
k k k s G f G ' =   (11) 
   11 
where  k f '  is a 1 by  k n  row vector of elements each equal to  ) / 1 ( k n ,  k n being the 
number of individuals in group k . Similarly  k s  is a  k n by one column vector giving the 
share of each individual belonging to group k  in the total income of this group. Finally 
k G  is a  k n  by  k n  G-matrix, the latter having been defined previously. 
Therefore in defining  01 W G  we assume that, in applying the expression given in (10), 
the population and income shares  k f  and  k w  are those at time 0. In computing  k G  
however we rank the individuals (in the vectors  k f '  and  k s ) according to their rank at 
time 1 but give these individuals their income at time 0. 
Similarly in defining  10 W G  we assume that in applying the expression given in (10), the 
population and income shares  k f  and  k w  are those at time 1. In computing  k G  however 
we rank the individuals (in the vectors  k f '  and  k s ) according to their rank at time 0 but 
give these individuals their income at time 1. 
Finally  in  computing  the  overall  Gini  indices  ts G   we  apply  again  the  general 
formulation for the Gini index  G I , that is,  
 
Gs e IG ' =   (12) 
 
where  ' e  is a 1 by n row vector of nelements each equal to  ) / 1 ( n , n being the overall 
size of the total population (including all the subgroups) and  s is a  n by 1 column 
vector whose elements are the shares of the individuals in total income. Note that the 
elements of both  ' e  and  s are ranked by decreasing individual income, no matter the 
group to which each individual belongs. G  in (12) is evidently a nby n G-matrix. 
Therefore in defining a Gini index  01 G  we assume that the individuals are ranked (in  ' f  
and  sin (12) ) according to their rank at time 1 but the individuals are given their 
income share at time 0. Similarly in defining a Gini index  10 G  we assume that the 
individuals are ranked (in  ' f  and  sin (12) ) according to their rank at time 0 but the 
individuals are given their income share at time 1.   
Note that the formulation for the non anonymous change in polarization which is given 
in  (8)  applies  to  the  cases  of  both  non-overlapping  and  overlapping  groups  (see, 
Deutsch and Silber, 2008b).  In the case of non-overlapping  groups the  overall Gini   12 
index is equal to the sum of the between and within groups Gini indices. In the case of 
overlapping groups the overall Gini index includes a third element which measures in 





4. An Empirical Illustration 
 
The data 
We use the 1985-2003 Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP), an employer-employee 
linked panel database developed by Italian Social Security administrative sources. For 
its  institutional  purposes,  the  Italian  Social  Security  Administration  collects  data  on 
both individual employees and firms (employers). The reference population is made up 
of all the people – Italian and foreign – who have worked in Italy even if for only part of 
their working career. The entire private sector is covered (about 10 million employees 
and 1.2 million firms per year) and a large representative sample has been extracted 
from this population. The WHIP does not include information about workers in the 
agricultural  sector  and  the  public  administration.  It  includes  information  about  the 
workers' age, professional category, sector, dates at which employment spells start and 
end, the type of contract held by the worker, the annual wages, the number of the days 
worked per year, etc… Note that in the administrative archives any information which is 
not especially of interest to the Italian Social Security Administration (e.g. the worker's 
level of education) is not collected. On the other hand, the degree of coverage and of 
accuracy of the administrative archives cannot be found in any other Italian dataset. 
Also note that we do not have any attrition problems because, once a certain group of 
individuals has been selected, it is possible to follow them over the entire period under 
investigation. 
We  selected  individuals  born  in  1970-2  and  observed  these  individuals  when  they 
entered the labor market. We focus on individuals who become employees in the private   13 
sector  (agriculture  is  excluded).
5  About  80%  of  these  individuals  entering  the  labor 
market are less than 28 years old and they can be followed over a 5-year horizon. Since 
we wish to investigate their wage-career profiles we need to observe individual wages at 
several points in time. We therefore restrict the sample to individuals that also worked 
three and five years after having entered the labor market. Our sample is composed of 
8311 individuals, 64% of them being males and 36% females. 
  
 
Wages distribution and inequality    
 
We  find  that  on  average  real  daily  wages
6  increase  as  the  workers'  career  becomes 
longer (see Table 1). In this context, the workers' career may be interpreted as the length 
of time individuals spend in the labor market or, equivalently, as potential experience / 
seniority.  In  fact,  we  admit  the  possibility  that  young  workers  experience 
unemployment spells (shorter than 2 years) because of the difficulty of finding the right 
matches and of long searching times.  The real daily wages are, on average, about 31 
euros at year 2000 prices at entry (about 800 euros monthly) and they grow by about 
45% during the period of 5 years. Figure 1 puts in evidence some important aspects of 
the earning distribution in Italy at the time of entry in the labor market and three and 
five years later. It gives a graphical representation of the density function of the wage 
distribution,  derived  from  the  kernel  estimation  method.  The  height  of  the  curve 
indicates the concentration of people at different points along the wage scale while the 
area under the curve between two wages levels shows the share of the population with 
wages between those two levels. The location, spread and mode of the wage distribution 
indicate respectively the real wage levels, wage inequality and wage clumping. The 
curves in Figure 1a are drawn on the basis of the whole sample. The density function 
corresponding to wage at entry shows that the vast majority of the population has low 
real  daily  wages.  The  left  hand  side  of  the  curve  appears  to  be  multimodal.  When 
                                                 
 
5 No self-employed or atypical workers (“parasubordinati”) are included in the sample: the main reason 
is that for such individuals we would have information about the length of their working spells but not 
about their job attributes and for our study we need the latter information.  
6 Daily wages are computed by dividing the gross annual wages (before taxes and inclusive of overtime 
and bonuses) by the number of days he/she got paid for during the year. Real wages are computed at year 
2000 prices. 
   14 
looking at the density function of wages three years after entry, we note a shift of the 
curve to the right. The curve becomes also flatter at very low wages (even though the 
clumping does not disappear completely). Both observations indicate that there was an 
overall  increase  in  wages  as  well  as  probably  a  decrease  in  inequality.  Finally  the 
density function of the wages five years after entry shows a further shift of the curve to 
the right and a “squashing up” of the curve which correspond to an additional increase 
in  wages  (probably  due  to  experience/seniority)  and  a  decrease  in  inequality.  The 
density appears now to be relatively smooth and unimodal: at both ends of the density 
function, the curve is now relatively thin, an indication that there are now fewer people 
with  very  low  or  very  high  wages.  Note  finally  that  all  three  curves  are  strongly 
asymmetrical towards the right, this implying that the proportion of employees earning 
more than the modal wage is larger than that earning less.  
In short Figure 1a (this is even more evident when looking at the data of Table 2) 
indicates that the inequality of earnings is lower five years after entry than at entry. The 
Gini index decreases by 28%, a consequence of the fact that the original multimodal 
wage distribution characterized by a large group of very low paid individuals became a 
unimodal distribution with fewer individuals with a low or a high pay.  
To interpret these findings, we need to understand the characteristics of the process of 
entry into the labor market in Italy. It turns out that only 36% of the individuals in our 
sample  are  hired  by  standard  contracts,  the  rest  (64%)  being  hired  on  the  basis  of 
specific  temporary  or  fixed  term  contracts  providing  apprenticeship  and  training 
components  (called  hereafter  “youth  contracts”)  under  the  name  of  apprenticeship 
contracts or training-at-work contracts (Contratti di Formazione e Lavoro, CFL). These 
contracts  should  be  considered  as  an  important  policy  tool  to  combat  youth 
unemployment and ease the insertion of youth into the labor market. The goals of such 
institutional arrangements are to hire first-time job seekers and train young workers. 
These contracts, in principle, offer a combination of work and training allowing workers 
to learn and accumulate experience. The CFL contracts are aimed at individuals aged 
15-29  with  at  least  upper  secondary  education  and  their  duration  is  1  or  2  years. 
Apprenticeship  contracts  are  aimed  at  individuals  aged  16-24  and  their  maximum 
duration is 4 years (while the minimum duration is 18 months). Incentives offered to 
firms  to  hire  on  the  basis  of  such  contracts  are  mainly  lower  social  security 
contributions and, in the case of apprenticeship contracts, the possibility to pay lower   15 
wages.  CFL contracts offer also incentives to firms to transform such contracts into 
ordinary contacts. 
In  Figure  1b  we  have  drawn  the  density  functions  of  the  wage  distributions  when 
individuals with apprenticeship contracts are excluded.
7 The density at the time of entry 
into  the  labor  market  appears  to  be  relatively  smooth  and  unimodal  and  strongly 
asymmetrical towards the right: at the both ends of the density function, the curve is  
relatively thin indicating that there are few people with very low or high wages. One 
should note that the proportion of individuals with a low pay is much smaller than the 
one  observed  in  Figure  1a  (the  density  referring  to  the  entire  sample,  including 
apprenticeship  contracts).  It  thus  appears  that  individuals  may  enter  into  the  labor 
market by two channels: standard contracts (and CFL) characterized by high wages and 
apprenticeship contracts characterized by low wages (see also Table 1). There is hence a 
clear  segmentation  of  the  labor  market  (Doeringer  and  Piore,  1971).  The  wage 
segmentation due to the dual system of entry seems however to disappear gradually 
over time (in Figure 1a, five years after entry, there are no more  multiple modes).  It 
thus appears that the majority of the individuals is only temporarily trapped in low 
wages.  
These results are in line with the predictions of the “entry port hypothesis” and clearly 
support  the  “theory  of  career  mobility”.
8  According  to  the  “entry  port  hypothesis”, 
youth contracts are transitional steps in the career trajectory and initial disadvantages 
are therefore likely to be overcome. In other words, the “entry port hypothesis” stresses 
the  temporary  character  of  the  first  job  and  assumes  fast  upward  mobility  and 
stabilization  of  the  career  (Contini  et  al.,  1999).  The  “theory  of  career  mobility” 
(Sicherman,  1991;  Scherman  and  Galor,  1990)  states  that  employees  accept  youth 
contracts  because  they  offer  better  chances  of  more  rapid  promotion:  that  is,  these 
positions serve as stepping-stones for the future career. This implies greater upward 
mobility from these jobs than from permanent positions (where the employees would 
not be promoted as quickly). As a result, workers overcome their initial disadvantages. 
Note  that  Schizzerotto  and  Cobalti  (1998)  report  that  the  Italian  labor  market  is 
                                                 
 
7 Very similar curves can be obtained considering only standard contracts (and, therefore, excluding 
youth contracts). 
8 The “entry port hypothesis” and the “theory of career mobility” are clearly related to each other (and, 
they have no real conceptual differences). Both hypotheses are conceptually in contrast to the “trap-effect 
hypothesis” (according to which, employees accepting youth contracts remain trapped into low wage 
jobs).   16 
primarily structured by internal labor markets, which means that the career mobility 
model is more likely to apply: access to internal career ladders in this case is made 
possible via certain entry positions (i.e. youth contract) and initial disadvantages are 
therefore likely to be overcome. We now move to the analysis of polarization to add 
empirical evidence supporting the above theory and in order to clarify the importance of 
mobility in the Italian labor market. 
 
Looking at the polarization of wages 
 
Since we find evidence of at least initial labor market segmentation, it is possible that 
looking at the degree of wage polarization may give more insights than simply looking 
at the inequality of wages. By polarization, we mean the extent to which the population 
is clustered around a small number of distant poles (Esteban and Ray, 1994).  Therefore, 
the more polarized a labor market (i.e. in terms of wages) is, the more likely it seems 
that conflicts and social tensions can emerge. One may thus consider the labor market as 
an  amalgamation  of  groups,  where  two  workers  belonging  to  the  same  group  are 
“similar” while two workers  from different  groups are “different”  with respect to  a 
given set of characteristics. Thus, polarization is a matter of groups. Note that two key 
concepts  define  polarization:  the  degree  of  homogeneity  within  each  group  and  the 
degree of heterogeneity across groups. In other words, high within-group homogeneity 
(that  can  be  measured  by  low  values  of  the  within  groups  Gini  index)  is  bound  to 
increase polarization while clear differences between two groups (implying a high value 
of the between groups Gini index) will increase polarization and social tension. There is 
thus  an  important  difference  between  the  concepts  of  polarization  and  inequality: 
increased within-group internal homogeneity which reduces inequality is expected to 
raise polarization. Finally, note that it is better to focus on a small number of groups in 
order to localize the feelings of conflict and avoid the multilateral checks and balances 
that ease tension (Esteban, 2001). 
Our  empirical  analysis  starts  from  the  observation  that  the  working  population  is 
already structured into groups  on the basis of, say, the gender, education, wage levels   
(low paid / normal paid), type of contract, occupation, sector and firm size. We will give 
various measures of polarization, using these alternative definitions of groups. Note that 
the index of polarization we use may be viewed as measuring the difference between the 
inter-group alienation (i.e. between groups Gini index) minus the “loss of identification"   17 
with one's own group due to the existence of within group inequality (i.e. the within 
groups Gini index), such a difference being computed relative to the overall level of 
inequality in the distribution. Our measure of polarization is hence minimal when inter-
group alienation is zero and within  group inequality is maximal (in which case the 
polarization measure becomes equal to -1).  Polarization is maximal when inter-group 
alienation is the greatest and within group inequality is zero (in which case the measure 
of polarization is equal to one). The index of polarization will thus take positive values 
whenever inter-group alienation is higher than within group inequality.  
Polarization  may  vary  over  time  and,  as  explained  in  Section  2,  this  change  in 
polarization may be due either to a change in the distribution of wages (what is often 
called "structural mobility", see, Markandya, 1982 and 1984) or a change in individual 
ranks (often called "exchange mobility", see, Markandya, 1982 and 1984). Our aim is to 
analyze changes in the level of polarization over time in order to understand the possible 
origins of tensions and conflicts among individuals with the same potential seniority. In 
order words, we would like to check whether there is eventually a relationship between 
labor market segmentation and potential seniority.  Table 3 reports the results of our 
analysis. 
We start by considering two groups defined on the basis of their wages: first low paid 
workers versus workers with somehow a "normal" wage, second workers with a very 
low wage versus the other workers, and third workers with a high wage versus the other 
workers. We define workers with a low (very low) wage those whose wage locates them 
among the lowest 20% (10%) of the wage distribution. The highly paid workers are the 
ones  located  among  the  upper  20%  of  the  wage  distribution.  It  appears  that  the 
distribution of wages at the time of entry into the labor market is the one with the 
highest degree of polarization when the two groups selected are highly paid versus the 
other workers. This is the only case where the measure of polarization is positive. This 
way of defining groups seems therefore to be the one which best identifies two groups, 
where each individual has a strong sense of identification with his/her own group. One 
may also observe that, whatever the way we define the groups, polarization increases 
when potential seniority increases. In other words, our results indicate an increase in the 
level  of  antagonism  either  between  workers  with  a  low  wage  and  the  remaining 
workers,  or  between  workers  with  high  wages  and  the  other  workers.  These 
observations led us to move to the case where three groups are considered: those with a 
low wage, individuals with a normal level of pay and workers with a high wage. In the   18 
first stage, at the time of entry in the labor force, polarization is equal to 0.555. But five 
year after entry, polarization increased by 11% (achieving the value of 0.616). This 
increase  is  partially  due  to  wage  changes  (67%),  that  is,  to  structural  mobility,  and 
partially (33%) to changes in ranks (exchange mobility). Both components have the 
same signs and sum up to increase antagonism.  
When looking at labor market segmentation on the basis of groups defined by their 
individual  characteristics  and  first  job  attributes  (see  Table  3)  we  observe  that  the 
degree of segmentation (that is strictly connected with the level of polarization) varies 
over time. Polarization between male and female workers is quite low but it increases 
with seniority. There is a 9% increase in five years: note that here structural mobility 
increases polarization while exchange mobility decreases polarization. When making a 
distinction between individuals with a low and high level of education
9 we observe that 
polarization  decreases  with  seniority:  structural  mobility  turns  out  to  decrease 
polarization and it overcomes the opposite effect of exchange mobility. When the two 
groups of workers correspond to industry versus services workers, polarization is low 
but  slightly  increases  with  seniority  (+4%),  mainly  as  consequence  of  structural 
mobility, since exchange mobility in itself reduces polarization. When workers working 
in small firms are compared with those working in medium or large firm, polarization is 
also  low  and  it  even  decreases  (by  5%)  with  seniority,  mainly  as  consequence  of 
structural mobility wage changes.  
The study of labor market segmentation on the basis of entry contracts and occupation 
is  of  special  interest  for  reasons  discussed  previously.  There  is  a  positive  level  of 
polarization when workers hired with apprenticeship contracts are compared with other 
workers.  This  confirms  what  was  mentioned  before  concerning  labor  market 
segmentation at the time of entry in the labor market. Note that in this case polarization 
decreases very quickly with seniority although it does not disappear completely. At the 
time of entry in the labor force, polarization is equal to 0.214, while five years later it is 
equal  to  0.044,  a  decrease  of  80%.  This  huge  decrease  is  mainly  due  to  structural 
mobility and may be explained by the fact that at the end of apprenticeship, contracts 
are renewed at higher wages.  Note that these results support the “entry port hypothesis” 
(previously mentioned). Therefore, individuals should be aware of the existence of high 
exchange mobility in the beginning of their careers; with this awareness, anticipation of 
                                                 
 
9 We use as proxy for education the age at the first job (low education if age<=20; otherwise)   19 
improvement in the immediate future is unlikely to lead to a credible threat of social 
unrest.  Finally, when comparing blue with white collar workers
10, we find a low degree 
of polarization but in this case polarization increases quickly with seniority. The rise in 
polarization  (about  36%)  is  mainly  due  to  structural  mobility.  It  thus  appears  that 
polarization linked to the existence of a dual entry labor market decreases with seniority 
while polarization related to occupation increases with seniority, but in both cases the 




This paper is a first attempt to combine the analysis of wage (income) polarization with 
that of wage (income) mobility. Using the polarization index PG recently proposed by 
Deutsch et al. (2007) we showed that, when taking the identity of the individuals into 
account (working with panel data), a distinction could be made between a change over 
time in polarization that is the consequence of "structural mobility" (change over time in 
the overall,  between and within groups inequality) and a change in polarization that is 
the sole consequence of "exchange mobility" (changes over time in the ranks of the 
individuals).  
This approach was then applied to the 1985-2003 Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP), 
an employer-employee linked panel database developed by the Italian Social Security 
administrative  sources.  This  empirical  investigation  seems  to  have  increased  our 
understanding of labor market segmentation in Italy, whether the groups are defined on 
the basis of the individual wages or when they are derived from other criteria such as 
white versus blue collar workers. Additional work is certainly needed before we can 
definitively conclude that the concept of polarization is an important tool to analyze 




                                                 
 
10 Excluding apprenticeship contracts.   20 
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(b) All sample except apprenticeship contracts   21 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Entry Characteristics:     Mean wage   Percentage 
   t=1  t=3  t=5    
Males  31.06  38.57  46.36  63.58 
Females  29.42  36.43  42.91  36.42 
             
Low paid   13.72  19.68  27.65  20.00 
Medium paid  28.81  36.01  42.64  60.00 
High paid   53.03  62.31  71.04  20.00 
             
Blue collars            
White collars            
             
Entry contracts            
    CFL  37.80  41.30  41.31  21.53 
   Trainers  18.86  24.58  30.58  42.47 
Standard contracts  39.84  45.75  51.89  36.00 
             
Small (0-19 employees)  29.10  36.84  43.91  64.12 
Medium-Large firms  38.67  46.19  53.36  35.88 
             
Services   34.11  42.00  49.15  35.84 
Industry  28.69  35.76  43.18  64.16 
             
Low-Educated (**)  23.81  31.46  39.15  67.22 
High-educated  44.62  51.40  58.03  32.78 
             
Wage (daily)  30.63  38.00  45.32  100.0 
Note: daily wage in Euro (2000)       







Table 2. Wage inequality 
 
Potential 
experience  GINI  GE(-1)  GE(0)  GE(1)  GE(2)  A(0.5)  A(1)  A(2) 
                          
t=1  0.2640  0.1295  0.1139  0.1095  0.1150  0.0545  0.1077  0.2058 
t=3  0.2253  0.0905  0.0824  0.0811  0.0863  0.0401  0.0791  0.1533 
t=5  0.1896  0.0611  0.0585  0.0599  0.0655  0.0291  0.0568  0.1088 
 
 
Note: GE refer to generalized entropy indices and A to the Atkinson index.  22
Table 3. Polarization measures 
 
Polarization P=(Gb-Gw)/G  P  P  P  difference   wage   rank  difference   wage   rank 
   t=1  t=3  t=5  (3 years)  changes  changes  (5 years)  changes  changes 
                            
Two no-overlapping groups:                           
Low paid /normal paid  -0.1642  -0.1447  -0.1775  0.0194  0.0015  0.0179  -0.0133  -0.0495  0.0361 
Very low paid / others  -0.5486  -0.5114  -0.5116  0.0372  0.0245  0.0127  0.0369  0.0032  0.0337 
High paid /others  0.1081  0.1361  0.1969  0.0280  0.0340  -0.0060  0.0888  0.1003  -0.0115 
                            
Three no-overlapping groups:                           
Low / normal / high paid  0.5552  0.5932  0.6157  0.0379  0.0284  0.0095  0.0604  0.0407  0.0198 
                            
Overlapping groups (*):                           
Males / females  -0.5112  -0.5060  -0.4648  0.0052  0.0074  -0.0022  0.0464  0.0555  -0.0091 
Blue / White collars (**)  -0.3206  -0.2442  -0.2055  0.0764  0.0898  -0.0134  0.1151  0.1350  -0.0199 
Entry Contracts / other contracts  -0.0209  -0.1386  -0.2030  -0.1177  -0.1246  0.0069  -0.1821  -0.2058  0.0237 
Apprenticeship contracts /other 
contracts  0.2139  0.1144  0.0441  -0.0994  -0.1001  0.0006  -0.1698  -0.1828  0.0130 
Small / Medium-large firm   -0.2252  -0.2400  -0.2368  -0.0148  -0.0139  -0.0009  -0.0116  -0.0152  0.0036 
Industry/Services   -0.3733  -0.3540  -0.3597  0.0194  0.0228  -0.0034  0.0136  0.0160  -0.0024 
Low educ. / High educ. (***)  0.1737  0.0900  0.0504  -0.0837  -0.0826  -0.0011  -0.1233  -0.1291  0.0058 
 
 (*)     groups defined by initial career characteristics 
(**)   individuals starting their career as trainers are not included in the sample, since we do not have information about their occupation 
(***) we use as proxy for education the age at the first job (low education if age<=20; otherwise)   23 




Let us start with expression (8) which was written as 
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As mentioned in Section 3, the first expression under brackets on the R.H.S. of  
(A-1)  measures  the  impact  of  structural  mobility  and  the  second  that  of  exchange 
mobility.  
Let us start with structural mobility. Assuming no change in (anonymous) within groups 
inequality ( 00 11 W W G G = ) we conclude, as stressed previously, that an increase between 
times 0 and 1 in (anonymous) between groups inequality  ) ( 00 11 B B G G f will lead to an 
increase in polarization. In such a case the impact of structural mobility on polarization 
will be positive. Similarly, for a given level of (anonymous) between groups inequality, 
an  increase  in  (anonymous)  within  groups  inequality  ) ( 00 11 W W G G f   will  decrease 
polarization.  In  this  case  the  effect  of  structural  mobility  on  polarization  will  be 
negative. 
 
Let us now take a look at the second expression on the R.H.S. of A-1 which measures 
the  impact  of  exchange  mobility.  Let  us  first  take  a  look  at  the  first  part  of  this 
expression which is written as  )] / ) (( ) / ) [(( 01 01 01 00 00 00 G G G G G G W B W B − − − . 
Assume  first  that  the  re-ranking  of  individuals,  which  is  at  the  origin  of  exchange 
mobility,  took  place  only  within  groups  so  that  B B B G G G = = 01 00 .  There  was  only 
within groups exchange mobility and by definition  Woo W G G p 01  and  00 01 G G p  (see, 
Silber, 1989, for a proof). We can now write that 
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It is then clear that  ) ( ) ( 01 00 W B W B G G G G − − p . Since  01 00 G G f , we can conclude that 
] / ) (( ) / ) [(( 01 01 00 00 G G G G G G W B W B − − p . In other words, ceteris paribus, within groups 
exchange mobility leads to a decrease in non anonymous polarization. 
Assume now that  there was only between groups re-ranking and no within groups re-
ranking. In such a case we can write that  W W W G G G = = 01 00 so that 
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Since  01 00 B B G G f , we may write that  ) ( ) ( 01 00 W B W B G G G G − − f . We also know that  
01 00 G G f .  However since  ) ( 00 00 W B G G G − f and  ) ( 01 01 W B G G G − f , we can conclude 
that  01 01 00 00 / ) ( / ) ( G G G G G G W B W B − − f  so that a re-ranking that takes place between 
groups leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase in non-anonymous polarization. 
 
If we now analyze the second element of the second part on the R.H. S. of (A-1), the 
one which is expressed as  )] / ) (( ) / ) [(( 11 11 11 10 10 10 G G G G G G W B W B − − −  and do a similar 
analysis,  we  would  reach  this  time  opposite  conclusions.  We  would  find  out  that,  
ceteris paribus, within groups exchange mobility leads to an increase in non anonymous 
polarization while a re-ranking that takes place between groups leads, ceteris paribus, to 
an decrease in non-anonymous polarization. 
 
We should however not be surprised to observe that the two elements on the second part 
of the R.H.S. of (A-1) lead to opposite conclusions, that is, that the effect of exchange 
mobility,  whether taking place between or within groups, has a different impact on 
anonymous polarization, depending on whether we measure the change in polarization 
via  G P ' ∆ or  G P ' ' ∆ . A somehow similar  uncertain result was stressed by Silber and 
Weber (2005) who showed that exchange mobility could be considered as having a 
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